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DELEGATION IN HARD TIMES: THE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT OF ARM’S LENGTH 
BODIES IN THE UK 
Katherine Tonkiss 
This paper explores the effectiveness of financial management tools in 
regulating the use of resources by arm’s length bodies (ALBs) in a period of 
fiscal stress. The paper presents research undertaken into the 
implementation of a new financial management tool for ALBs in the UK 
since the 2008 financial crisis. Drawing on conflict ambiguity theory, the 
paper shows how the effectiveness of such tools is affected by deep-rooted 
tensions implicit within arm’s length governance. This gives rise to micro-
level conflict over the means of achieving fiscal regulation, underpinned by 
macro-level ambiguity over the logic of governance pursued by the 
government. 
Introduction 
The global financial crisis of 2008 and subsequent economic recession has meant that 
processes of financial management at the heart of governments around the world are 
under increasing scrutiny (Caperchione et al. 2014; Peters 2011; Papenfuß 2014). One 
consequence of this has been to focus attention on the financial management of arm’s 
length bodies (ALBs; also called independent agencies, public bodies or quangos), 
organisations which spend public money to deliver key policy objectives but exist at 
‘arm’s length’ from ministerial control and therefore have far greater autonomy than 
government departments typically enjoy. In a climate of fiscal stress, stricter measures to 
oversee and control the finances of ALBs have been introduced (McCarthaigh 2012; 
Skelcher et al. 2013). 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the effectiveness of financial management tools in 
regulating the use of resources by ALBs. The paper focuses on the implementation of a 
new financial controls framework in the UK, which was introduced in 2010. It employs 
the conflict-ambiguity model of policy implementation (Matland 1995) as a theoretical 
framework. This model, which has been largely overlooked by the arm’s length 
governance literature, seeks to expose and analyse the different and often conflicting 
perceptions of different actors engaged in policy implementation. 
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Through the analysis of extensive qualitative data, the paper shows that the introduction 
of the new financial control tool in the UK reflects a new model of financial management 
of ALBs, where the role of the core executive – and in particular the Cabinet Office – is 
strengthened. However, this new model is shown to have resulted in some perverse 
effects which limit its effectiveness. These effects can be explained by micro-level conflict 
over the means of achieving fiscal regulation within ALBs, underpinned by contrasting 
perceptions of independence and accountability of ALBs which themselves stem from 
macro-level ambiguity over the logic of governance pursued by the government, with 
both a centrifugal strategy of delegation to ALBs and a centripetal strategy of greater 
centralised control. At a broader level, therefore, the research suggests that the 
effectiveness of financial management tools in regulating the use of resources by ALBs is 
affected by deep-rooted tensions in delegated governance which come to the fore during 
periods of fiscal stress. 
The Delegated Finance Problem 
In many countries around the world, the new public management trend which developed 
since the 1970s led to a large scale proliferation of ALBs, based on the idea that the 
autonomy of these bodies would make them more efficient and more flexible – and 
therefore would deliver greater capacity to be responsive to the needs of citizens (Hood 
1991; McLaughlin et al. 2002; Pollitt and Talbot 2004). As a result, ALBs became key 
institutions in public service delivery. 
This trend towards arm’s length governance was, however, countered in the early 21st 
century by a concern that the proliferation of ALBs was eroding accountability, bringing 
to the fore a desire on the part of governments to reassert political control (Kim 2003; 
Smullen 2010; Van Thiel 2011). The context of public sector austerity which resulted 
from the 2008 financial crisis and which has persisted into the second decade of the 21st 
century has deepened this impetus for greater control. Public management has 
increasingly rejected the decentralising and deregulating logic of new public 
management and has instead turned to a range of centrally imposed ‘cutback 
management’ strategies to reconcile the delivery of quality public services with a desire 
to reduce public sector expenditure (Peters 2011; Papenfuß 2014; Leslie and Canwell 
2010; Pandey 2010). For ALBs, this has meant reform and sometimes abolition of bodies 
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in favour of more central control over policy delivery, and more control exerted over the 
bodies that remain. 
Indeed, fiscal stress has led to what could be termed a ‘delegated finance problem’ in 
arm’s length governance, where governments face the challenge of attempting to reap the 
benefits of delegation to ALBs while also curtailing their use of resources. Delegating to 
ALBs is widely recognised as a balancing act between autonomy and control aimed at 
maximising the efficiency and effectiveness of policy delivery (Barbieri et al. 2011; 
Verhoest et al. 2004; Verhoest 2005), but it is this very balance which is problematized 
at moments of financial crisis. The growth of governmental regulation of expenditure by 
ALBs is the key way in which governments have attempted to address the delegated 
finance problem, implementing financial management tools which more closely regulate 
the expenditure of ALBs while retaining the autonomy of ALBs to deliver policy objectives 
(Van Thiel et al. 2012).1 
However, little is known about the effectiveness of these financial management tools in 
regulating the use of resources by ALBs. What factors affect this effectiveness? How is 
arm’s length status reconciled with the desire for greater control? Research undertaken 
in the UK aimed to address these questions. 
Research Design 
The UK offers an ideal context in which to examine the effectiveness of financial 
management tools in regulating the use of resources by ALBs. Since the 1970s, there has 
been a large scale increase in ALBs as a result of the introduction of new public 
management reforms (Skelcher et al. 2000). Robust control mechanisms for ALBs have 
traditionally been absent, and together with ‘ad hoc, unprincipled and asymmetrical’ 
relationships between government departments and ALBs, led to a ‘poor parenting’ 
approach to the management of ALBs (Flinders 2008: 165). 
It is in this context that the Coalition Government (2010-), in a climate of fiscal stress 
following the 2008 financial crisis, sought to strengthen relationships between 
                                                          
1 It should be noted that autonomy and control are not binary opposites, and rather more autonomy may 
exist, for example, over the operational management of the ALB, while more control may be exerted over the 
policy direction, and so forth. The focus of this paper is on the managerial and financial aspects of autonomy 
and control, as per the typology of Verhoest et al. (2004; see also Verhoest et al., 2012). 
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departments and ALBs and specifically to implement greater financial regulation of ALBs 
through the introduction of a new financial management tool. This blanket reform of the 
balance between autonomy and control experienced by ALBs has brought significant 
implications for the model of arm’s length financial management in the UK. 
Research undertaken in the UK in 2012-2013 sought to provide an understanding of the 
ways in which the new financial management tool has changed the financial regulation of 
ALBs, and the factors affecting how effective these changes have been in regulating the 
use of resources by ALBs. The research was qualitative in character, adding a new layer 
of insight to the existing rich quantitative research on arm’s length autonomy and control 
(cf. Verhoest et al. 2012). A vast amount of data was collected for documentary analysis, 
including government publications as well as internal documentation relating to the new 
financial management tool (obtained via a contact within the Cabinet Office). Six semi-
structured, open-ended interviews were undertaken with senior civil servants in three 
Whitehall departments with responsibility for the implementation of the new financial 
control tool, with a further two interviews completed with Cabinet Office officials. The 
interviews focused on the process of implementation of the new tool, the effectiveness of 
the tool in regulating resource use, its effects on relationships between government and 
ALBs and its effects on ALB autonomy. These interviews were transcribed and analysed 
for common themes. 
Additionally, a two-hour roundtable discussion with fifteen chairs of ALBs was held on 
the subject of the new financial management tool and its implications for arm’s length 
status, as well as its effectiveness in regulating resource use. It was also then possible to 
contextualise this analysis within over one hundred further interviews conducted with 
politicians, civil servants and chairs of public bodies across Government which were 
undertaken for a wider project on public bodies reform of which the subject of this paper 
was just one part. The topic guide for these wider interviews included a question about 
the effect of the financial management tool on with relationships between departments 
and ALBs. All of the interviews lasted for one hour and participants were each 
interviewed once. 
Conflict-Ambiguity Theory 
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Conflict-ambiguity theory presents a particularly useful way of exploring the 
implementation of the new financial management tool in the UK. Conflict-ambiguity 
theory is based on the assertion that policy implementation is shaped by the level of 
conflict over the policy to be implemented and the level of ambiguity present in the 
process of implementation (Matland 1995; for specific applications to 
financial/accounting policy see Arnaboldi and Lapsley 2009; Pipan and Czarniawska 
2010; Schofield and Sausman 2004). In contrast to traditional models of policy 
implementation which are based on the presumption that implementation is a ‘top-down’ 
process (e.g. Pressman and Wildavsky 1973), the focus of the conflict-ambiguity 
approach is on the ‘diverse micro-level contexts of implementation’ (Wallace and Hoyle 
2012, p.979) and the goals, interests and perceptions of actors within those contexts. It is 
particularly useful when considering complex implementation processes involving a 
multitude of different actors, such as in the case of arm’s length governance where the 
regulation of resource use is implemented by actors both within government and in ALBs. 
The approach defines conflict as occurring when more than one organisation perceives a 
policy to be relevant to its interests and when these organisations have clashing views. 
This conflict can be related to the goals that a policy is intended to achieve, or the plans 
for how the policy is to be implemented. Ambiguity is thought to arise when a policy 
comes to have more than one meaning to different actors in the process of 
implementation – and this can again be ambiguity of policy goals or ambiguity over the 
means of achieving those goals. The theory hypothesises that conflict is limited by 
increasing the ambiguity of a policy to be implemented, because if a policy is less clearly 
defined then it is more open to interpretation and less likely to be perceived to clash with 
interests (Baier et al. 1986; Hordern 2014; Matland 1995). 
In the context of the present paper, the conflict-ambiguity lens complements an analysis 
of the top-down processes of implementation of the new tool with an analysis of 
relationships between the actors and organisations across government and ALBs, and the 
conflicts and ambiguities that arise between these actors in attempting to reconcile 
delegation with financial regulation in a fragmented organisational context. 
Towards a New Model of Financial Management 
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To understand how the financial management of ALBs in the UK has changed in recent 
years, it is first necessary to set out the traditional model of financial management which 
was in effect prior to 2010. Under this traditional model, the financial management of 
ALBs was heavily delegated to the sponsor departments of government and to ALBs 
themselves. The Treasury took a strategic approach, setting departmental budgets on a 
three yearly basis (HM Treasury 2013a: 8). Departments were then at liberty to spend 
that budget according to their own priorities, and to make decisions about how much of 
that budget should be allocated to their ALBs – allocations which were set out in annual 
grant letters together with priority areas for spending. Permanent Secretaries were the 
Accounting Officers to Parliament for all money including that allocated to ALBs, and it 
was the responsibility of departments to ‘ensure that [ALBs] are able to control the 
expenditure of their Public Bodies in order to stay within their limits’ (Cabinet Office 
2006b: 1). The delegation of authority to the ALB to spend this money was then set out 
in a Financial Memorandum for each ALB, which provided details on the ALB’s funding 
arrangements, financial delegations, budgeting processes and banking (p.12). 
This traditional model of financial management is set out in Figure 1. Parliament 
delegates authority for setting budgets and managing expenditure to the Treasury. The 
Treasury then sets departmental expenditure limits, and delegates responsibility for 
setting the expenditure limits of ALBs to departments. ALBs are then held to account for 
their expenditure through the production of an annual report and accounts, which is 
subject to approval by the Treasury and, ultimately, Parliament. The accounts of some 
ALBs – specifically those with advisory or tribunal roles which are typically smaller, with 
smaller budgets and no programme expenditure – are not presented separately to 
Parliament but rather as a part of the departmental accounts; however, the process of 
annual reporting is the same. Under this traditional model, ALBs are also held to account 
through internal and external financial auditing processes.  
FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE 
The relative independence of ALBs was emphasised under the traditional model. While it 
was noted that ‘[w]here the [ALB] relies on government to finance all or part of its 
expenditure it will be necessary to decide what controls and safeguards are to be 
exercised by the sponsor department’, it was also emphasised that ‘[i]n all cases the aim 
7 
 
should be to delegate responsibility to the [ALB] to the maximum extent practicable where 
this offers improved value-for-money and can be done within an agreed policy and 
resources framework’ (Cabinet Office 2006a, emphasis added). While the same document 
does give guidance on when an ALB should be more closely managed (i.e. where it holds 
a monopoly position or is financed by compulsory levy), it also notes that the general 
working assumption was that external market forces would drive efficiency and value for 
money, meaning that ALBs had the freedom, within the agreed processes and guidance, 
to manage their own expenditure. 
However, since 2010 this model of arm’s length financial management has been 
reformed, with significant implications for the financial freedom of ALBs. Austerity 
measures aimed at reducing the public sector budget deficit led to a tightening of 
departmental spending limits, as is reflected in the 2010 Comprehensive Spending 
Review.  For example, the Department for Communities and Local Government faced an 
overall budget reduction of 33% over four years, the Department for Energy and Climate 
Change 30% and the Home Office 23% (HM Treasury 2010: 48-61). These tightened 
departmental budgets had implications for the spending power of ALBs, because their 
budgets are funded from departmental budgets. 
At the same time that these austerity measures were being implemented across the public 
sector, the government was also pursuing an agenda to reform the ALB landscape in the 
UK. In his rationale for this agenda, Minister for the Cabinet Office Francis Maude MP 
highlighted aims to ‘increase accountability in public life’, by bringing functions 
undertaken specifically by non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs – a specific subset of 
ALBs, distinguished from, for example, executive agencies and public corporations) back 
into government – and therefore under direct ministerial control, ‘while making savings 
and driving out inefficiency and waste’ (HC Deb 516) by removing the duplication of 
functions and improving the efficiency of bodies that remain. As a result, over 500 NDPBs 
were either abolished or significantly reformed (Dommett et al. 2013). 
The goal of reducing spending across the public sector, together with the implementation 
of a significant programme of NDPB reform, has led to an emphasis on increasing the 
financial regulation of the ALBs that remain, in order to constrain the use of resources by 
those bodies while retaining their delegated status. The specific focus of initiatives to 
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increase control is on administrative spending, while smaller budget allocations to ALBs 
as a result of smaller departmental budgets have driven efficiency in programme 
expenditure. In 2010, the government introduced a raft of controls on administrative 
spending, whereby spending over certain limits is subject to further approval from the 
Cabinet Office, who are delegated this authority by the Treasury. 
The Treasury’s core publication, Managing Public Money, which sets the standards and 
guidelines for all financial processes across Government, reflected this change when it 
was updated in 2013. It states that the Treasury ‘may also work through the Cabinet 
Office to set certain standards applicable across government’ (HM Treasury 2013b), 
something which was not included in the previous version (HM Treasury 2007). It should 
be noted that spending controls do not apply only to ALBs – they apply across spending 
departments as well – however, given that the remit of this article is to explore these 
changes with regards to the delegated finance problem, the focus here will be limited to 
ALBs. 
The introduction of these financial controls represents a significant change in the 
traditional model of financial management of ALBs, towards a new model which accords 
a far greater role for the Cabinet Office. Parliament continues to delegate authority to the 
Treasury  to lead on financial management, and the Treasury continues to allocate 
budgets to departments, thereby delegating the authority to set ALB budgets to those 
departments (and, as before, the Permanent Secretaries remain Accounting Officers to 
Parliament). However, the extent to which those ALBs then have the authority to spend 
their funds is ‘subject to limits which may require approval’ (HM Treasury 2013b: 9). This 
refers to powers that are delegated by the Treasury to the Cabinet Office (specifically, the 
Efficiency and Reform Group – ERG – of the Cabinet Office) to exert tightened regulation 
of spending in areas including IT, property, marketing, advertising, recruitment and 
consultancy (p.11). As Chief Secretary to the Treasury Danny Alexander MP, together 
with Francis Maude, explained in a letter to departments in 2011, these processes of 
tighter financial control are intended to provide ‘government with the tools to ensure that 
operational spend is challenged closely: helping to ensure that we drive down spend on 
lower value areas to help protect our key priorities’. 2 
                                                          
2 Document obtained from the Cabinet Office. 
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The powers delegated to the Cabinet Office are most clearly expressed in the Spending 
Controls Framework, a new financial management tool which sets out the limits within 
which departments can operate without Cabinet Office approval, and the point at which 
Cabinet Office or Treasury approval is required. Departments may permit ALBs to spend 
up to the level 1 limit without any further approval, or they may implement their own 
process under which ALBs are required to gain approval from their parent department 
before spending amounts of money below the level 1 limit. This is at the discretion of 
individual departments, and they may set an approvals process that is common to all of 
their ALBs, or they may apply more control over spending to bodies that, for example, are 
particularly high risk.3 Level 2 spend is that which is above the level 1 limit and requires 
Cabinet Office approval. Level 3 spend refers to ‘major projects’ funding, which involves 
very large amounts of money and requires Treasury approval in addition to that of the 
Cabinet Office. The full scope of the spending controls framework, together with the 
parameters of level 2 approvals, is set out in Table 1. 
TABLE 1 AROUND HERE 
The spending controls framework has been implemented alongside other mechanisms 
designed to hold ALBs to account for good financial management. Together with the 
NDPB reform programme, the government also introduced a new process of Triennial 
Reviews, whereby NDPBs are reviewed every three years. These reviews focus on the 
extent to which specific functions of the body still need to be carried out at arm’s length, 
and – if so – the quality of the governance of the body. One of the areas focused on in this 
governance element is effective financial management, under which it is expected that 
‘[t]he public body has taken appropriate steps to ensure that effective systems of financial 
management and internal control are in place’ (Cabinet Office 2011a: 30-31). This 
includes annual reporting, internal and external audit functions, anti-fraud measures and 
rules governing the claiming of expenses. In many ways, this is similar to the 
accountability processes in place prior to 2010 that were detailed above, and explains 
how ALBs are held to account for non-administrative spending which is beyond the scope 
of the controls framework. 
                                                          
3 Risk in relation to the governance of ALBs is typically thought of in terms of both financial risk (i.e. historical 
of poor financial management) and other issues such as the wider performance of the body or its political 
salience. 
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Despite these similarities, the changes in financial management of ALBs detailed suggest 
that a new model has been developed, which involves tightened regulation of the finances 
of ALBs by central government and generates a far greater role for the Cabinet Office as 
a result of the delegation of authority from the Treasury. This model, showing the 
insertion of the Cabinet Office as a new actor in the system, is detailed in Figure 2. 
FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE 
How effective has this new model been in regulating the use of resources by ALBs, and 
what factors help to explain this effectiveness? This question is the subject of the next 
section. 
Regulating Resource Use through the New Model 
There is some evidence that the new model of financial management has been effective 
in regulating the use of resources by ALBs. In their first nine months of operation, the 
Cabinet Office claims that the new processes for regulating spending delivered £133m of 
savings on marketing and advertising, £350m savings on consultancy, a 75% reduction 
in recruitment activity and a 30% reduction in the recruitment of temporary staff.4 A 
recent study by the National Audit Office (2013) has also reported significant ongoing 
savings as a result of the implementation of the spending controls. As one civil servant 
described, ‘if we’re going to go to the Cabinet Office and ask for an exemption we need to 
be really clear as to why we’re doing that. That perhaps makes them [ALBs] think about 
why they’re doing it and perhaps could they do it in different ways’ (participant 4). 
However, attempting to regulate the resource use of ALBs has also given rise to some 
perverse effects. These are particularly apparent in instances of non-compliance with the 
controls framework. Non-compliance can be overt, i.e. spending money without seeking 
appropriate approval, and this was reported by a number of interviewees in the research 
(participants 1, 3 and 5). As one civil servant noted, ‘in relation to ALBs, they’re quite a 
tricky area. I think there’s more effort on trying to circumvent the controls than there is 
on anything else’ (participant 1), and another noted, ‘you can encourage dysfunctional 
behaviour and then you can encourage people trying to sidestep controls, which is really 
not good’ (participant 5). 
                                                          
4 Data obtained from Cabinet Office. Figures refer to savings across both departments and ALBs. 
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It can also take a less obvious form – that is, not incurring expenditure on projects that 
would otherwise have been undertaken on the grounds of not wanting to engage in the 
controls process. This latter form of non-compliance was also evident in the research. For 
example, one civil servant reported that ‘bureaucracy that was created prevented people 
from spending money… they decided that [the process of gaining approval] simply wasn’t 
worth the time and effort’ (participant 3). Preparing business cases, writing up 
paperwork and processing cases through the system for level 2 and level 3 approval is 
time consuming for departments and ALBs. Departments estimate that 20% of this time 
involves departmental processes and 80% involves Cabinet Office and Treasury approval 
mechanisms. While the National Audit Office (2013) notes that the Cabinet Office and 
Treasury are committed to deliver decisions on spending requests within a 28 day 
timeframe, the clock is stopped each time a query is raised. It is then not unusual for 
business cases to go through ’30-40 iterations’ as a result of such queries, and this has 
therefore meant that the 28 day timeframe has been stretched to as long as nine months 
(participant 1). 
As such, it is not necessarily the case that the Cabinet Office, as the new actor in the 
system, is asserting direct control over spending. Rather, savings in spending may – at 
least in part – be due to non-compliance by not engaging in spending that would 
necessitate approval. This means that resources are being constrained, but that this is not 
occurring through the intended control mechanisms – essentially, government is not 
regulating what should be spent because ALBs are deciding not to spend. As one civil 
servant reflected, ‘you’re making it more difficult for people to spend money. So although 
you can deliver the desired outcome, which is reduced spend, you don’t necessarily 
improve financial management’ (participant 5). The immediate problem is addressed, but 
the deeper issues of control are not resolved. Conflict-ambiguity theory provides a useful 
lens for explaining why these perverse effects of non-compliance have arisen, and this 
explanation is illustrated in Figure 3. 
FIGURE 3 AROUND HERE 
There was very little conflict or ambiguity to be found in the research over the overall 
policy objective of reducing public sector expenditure. The main source of conflict was, 
rather, the means by which this policy objective was to be achieved with respect to ALBs 
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– i.e. the new financial management tool – and it is this conflict which has driven those 
instances of non-compliance. The conflict is evident across two key themes. The first of 
these is independence. Conflict over the amount of independence that ALBs should be 
given was reported, as one chair noted at a roundtable session: 
There is an important distinction between control – the line of control from 
ministers, and often that is confused with controls, which is the 
bureaucratic process. I don’t think any of us would object in any way to 
control, but that has become so easily confused with lots and lots of detailed 
controls rather than the real function of control which should be about 
strategy (participant 8). 
Evident here is a view that it is the role of government to oversee the strategy and policy 
direction of ALBs, but not the operational affairs of such bodies. Other chairs of ALBs 
similarly expressed the view that they feel they are being ‘micromanaged’ by their 
departments and the Cabinet Office. This was expressed by chairs as ‘the erosion of 
accountability for decision-making’ within ALBs (participant 7) as well as ‘a threat to 
service delivery’ on the grounds of the increasingly time consuming bureaucratic 
processes (participant 8), and as curtailing the ability of chairs to ‘innovate with less 
resources’ (participant 6) which was seen as a responsibility of chairs of ALBs who 
brought private sector experience to their roles. This conflict over independence was also 
reflected by civil servants, as one reflected: 
There’s always this thing about NDPBs because they seem to be 
independent. Sometimes they think that independence means the rules 
don’t necessarily apply to them, because otherwise how can they be 
independent? I’m constantly having to tell them well you know it does apply 
to them because they’re part of Government. That’s I guess where 
sometimes things don’t work as well as they could. It’s the fact… how 
independent is independence? (participant 4) 
The second conflict theme evident in the research is accountability. As was summarised 
in the traditional model, ALBs are typically held to account through the presentation of 
annual accounts to Parliament and through both internal and external audit. These 
mechanisms remain in place under the new model, however there are some perceptions 
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that the introduction of the Cabinet Office’s role in financial management has 
circumvented, or at least blurred, these lines of accountability in relation to 
administrative spending. This was summarised particularly well by one chair: 
The spending controls have really affected us. It’s a question of 
accountability. My argument is that the authority to spend certain amounts 
of money to fulfil what Parliament wants is a matter for myself and my 
colleagues. The way I expect to be held to account, rightly of course, is 
through the Secretary of State and Parliament through budget lines and all 
the rest of it, performance targets. (participant 9) 
This sentiment was echoed by another chair: ‘I have accountability to Parliament, but I’m 
increasingly finding more and more expectations through the National Audit Office and 
to the Cabinet Office controls and for me that affected me quite significantly – a significant 
line of accountability and not a very public one. There is some potential for conflict 
between them, it seems to me’ (participant 10). The existence of ‘turf battles’ between 
public sector audit bodies and government is the subject of existing research (Bowerman 
et al. 2003), and the addition of the Cabinet Office in financial management practices may 
add to these complexities. The mention of ‘public’ in the quote also highlights the tension 
between the nature of parliamentary accountability which rests on the assumption that 
bodies which spend public money are held to account by representatives of the public, 
and the rather more hidden bureaucratic processes of gaining approval from the Cabinet 
Office. 
These concerns were expressed by the Public Accounts Committee in relation to the 
extent to which the Cabinet Office spending approvals process compromises the 
Accounting Officers’ responsibility to Parliament in securing value for money in public 
spending (National Audit Office 2013: 30). While there may be some grounds, therefore, 
to suggest that the new model has given rise to accountability problems, perceptions of 
accountability on the part of chairs reveal further tensions and conflicts in policy 
implementation. Chairs view their bodies as having a direct accountability relationship 
with Parliament and cast the Cabinet Office as diverting this accountability and curtailing 
their responsibility for their actions in the process. 
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This latter point became particularly apparent in discussions of the implications of the 
new model for the accountability of the board of the ALB, including the accountability of 
the chair and chief executive. For example, one chair noted: ‘the situation that we find 
ourselves in is that we have to have authorisations for things which I think I have 
authority to do’ (participant 7), and another reflected on feeling responsible for actions 
and decisions: 
You feel less responsibility for the decisions being made because, you know, 
someone else has made them. So my concept of accountability is that you 
feel responsible for the organisation that you are running, that’s a really 
important managerial concept it seems to me. And it definitely undermines 
that a fair amount. (participant 10) 
Similarly civil servants reflected on the extent to which perceived ‘micro-management’ 
had affected accountability and the tensions that this gave rise to. As one civil servant 
described: 
Certainly they feel… that they are being micro-managed. Therefore their 
accountability has eroded. I would say if you put detailed controls in place 
you do take away the accountability of a body for its own budget because 
even they’re not accountable for its decisions. It has to get somebody else 
to endorse them (participant 2). 
Another tied this loss of accountability to trust in the ALB: ‘it’s recognising that there are 
things, if we were asked the question we might not spend the money in that way but we 
have to trust that the arm’s length bodies will take responsibility’ (participant 3). 
In summary then, high degrees of conflict over independence and accountability affected 
the implementation of the new financial management tool for ALBs in the UK research 
and underpinned the problems of non-compliance experienced. The roots of this conflict 
can be observed in wider ambiguity over the logic of arm’s length governance 
underpinning the policy objective to save public money. Attempts to increase central 
control over ALBs have coincided with the Civil Service Reform agenda which is 
designed specifically to ‘hive off’ functions out of central government responsibility in 
order to deliver efficiencies (HM Government 2012; Tonkiss and Noonan 2013). The co-
existence of tightening regulation over ALBs at the same time as pursuing alternative 
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models of service delivery with greater autonomy from government – such as the 
creation of mutuals to exercise public functions or the contracting out of those functions 
to the private sector – has created multiple models of financial regulation operating at 
arm’s length. 
As such, there is ambiguity over the model of governance that the government is 
pursuing to achieve efficiencies. It is continuing to deliver a wide range of services 
through ALBs and is further hiving off functions into even more delegated organisational 
forms, while at the same time implementing stronger financial regulation for ALBs with 
a strongly centralising logic. This macro-level ambiguity is feeding micro-level conflict 
over the means of achieving efficiency as a result of tensions over the applicability of 
different notions of independence and accountability. It is indicative of the inability of 
government to resolve the deeper tension between the perceived benefits to be gained 
from arm’s length governance and the perceived accountability gains offered by more 
direct government control, and over how to deliver efficiency – to trust the agent or to 
closely regulate their use of resources. 
Conclusion 
This paper has explored the effectiveness of financial management tools in regulating the 
use of resources by ALBs, in a context where fiscal stress has led to the ‘delegated finance 
problem’ in arm’s length governance; that is, governments face the challenge of 
attempting to reap the benefits of delegation to ALBs while also regulating their use of 
resources. The paper focused on the implementation of a new financial controls 
framework in the UK, drawing on conflict-ambiguity theory to help explain the 
unintended consequences of the introduction of this framework. Through its analysis, the 
paper demonstrated how problems of non-compliance were found in circumstances of 
micro-level conflict over the means of achieving a policy objective to reduce public sector 
spending. This conflict originated in tensions over independence and accountability, 
which themselves related to ambiguity over the model of arm’s length governance 
pursued by the government. 
As a result, the core finding of the paper is that the effectiveness of financial management 
tools in regulating the use of resources by ALBs is affected by deep-rooted tensions over 
independence and accountability in arm’s length governance which come to the fore 
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during periods of fiscal stress. This finding adds critical insight to the literature on arm’s 
length governance by highlighting how autonomy and control dynamics are affected by 
financial crisis. It also has strong international relevance, as the very same countries 
which introduced ALBs as a result of the trend towards new public management now find 
themselves faced with financial crisis and the task of reconciling the logic of arm’s length 
governance with greater financial oversight. It suggests that centripetal and centrifugal 
tensions within arm’s length governance are not easily resolved and are likely to give rise 
to implementation challenges without careful strategic oversight – oversight which may 
be lacking during periods of financial crisis when there is impetus to act quickly (Peters 
2011). This is also a critical insight for policy-makers and those tasked with 
implementation, as it highlights challenges in regaining administrative control over 
spending during periods of fiscal stress. 
Finally, the paper raises critical insights for conflict-ambiguity theory. The research did 
not find instances of ‘high conflict, high ambiguity’ co-existing, and so this field of Figure 
3 remains empty, in agreement with the findings of the wider conflict-ambiguity 
literature. However, the research demonstrates that conflict and ambiguity can co-exist 
at different levels – in this case, micro-level conflict over the means of implementation 
and macro-level ambiguity over the model of governance pursued. Further research 
could be undertaken to shed more light on how micro- and macro- levels of 
implementation and governance interact and the effects of this on policy implementation 
in other policy fields. 
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Figure 1: Traditional Model of Financial Management of ALBs 
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Table 1: Spending Controls Framework 
Source: Cabinet Office (2013: 8-13). 
Control Scope Delegated limit 
Advertising, 
marketing and 
communications 
Digital activity, publicity, events, 
resources and materials, research, 
strategy development, market 
research, printing, publications, 
events, public relations activity. 
Level 2 approval: 
- spending above £100k. 
Strategic supplier 
management 
New expenditure, contract 
extension, major contract 
variation, disputes. 
Level 2 approval: 
- spending above £5m for new 
expenditure, contract extension, or 
contract variation 
- any spending on disputes. 
Commercial 
models 
Disposals of businesses/assets, 
outsourcing contracts, creation of 
a new organisation. 
Level 2 approval: 
- spending above £5m on outsourcing 
contracts 
- any spending on disposals or new 
creations. 
ICT ICT expenditure, common 
infrastructure solutions. 
Level 2 approval: 
- ICT expenditure above £5m lifetime 
costs 
- ICT expenditure on administrative 
expenditures above £1m 
- Common infrastructure solutions 
above £100k. 
Digital service 
delivery 
Identity assurance, digital services 
including the commissioning of all 
government digital activity. 
Level 2 approval is needed for all 
expenditure. 
Recruitment New permanent recruitment, new 
temporary recruitment, 
secondment from an external 
organisation, extensions of 
existing temporary recruitment. 
Cabinet Office is not directly involved in 
approvals, however departments are 
required to submit quarterly 
recruitment forecasts to Cabinet Office. 
Consultancy Central government consultancy. Level 1 approval: 
- expenditure above £20,000. 
Level 2 approval: 
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- expenditure above £20,000 where 
contracts are expected to exceed 9 
months, and for expenditure on 
procurement related consultancy. 
Redundancy Redundancy schemes. Level 2 approval is needed for all 
schemes. 
Civil service 
learning 
Department-specific and generic 
learning and development 
services. 
Level 2 approval: 
- generic learning and development 
services. 
- department-specific spend above £10k. 
Property New leases/licences and 
renewals, new acquisitions, new 
build developments, new facilities 
management contracts. 
Level 2 approval: 
- rental expenditure above £100k during 
the life of the lease commitment. 
- new and extended facilities 
management contracts. 
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Figure 2: New Model of Financial Management of ALBs 
 
 
  
24 
 
Figure 3. Conflict and ambiguity in the implementation of a new financial 
management tool for ALBs 
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